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ing operations. Essentially, that ended
the Shelby Series 1 dealer network.
Orders stopped being taken and what-
ever cars had yet to be delivered, were.
By the end of 2002 a lot had changed.
A few unsold cars were sold through
auctions (most notable was a spe-
cially-optioned car with a super-
charger and other unique equipment
that sold for $217,000 at Barrett-Jack-
son).
Shelby American had parts to
complete 500 cars but only about 250
had been sold. They announced that
they would sell a Series 1 to anyone
who walked through their doors in Las
Vegas. The price was reduced from
$175,000 to $142,000. There is no
record how many cars were sold in
this manner but cars began to appear
on the secondary market at prices
from $90,000 to $125,000.
No attempt had been made to re-
certify any of the cars made after
1999. They had slipped off the govern-
ment’s radar until an inquiring poten-
tial buyer contacted them and asked if
he purchased a car in 2001, would it
be certified. This caused some initial
interest by the EPA, but the number
of cars was so small it was decided to
just ignore them. By March of 2002 all
of the cars had been completed. Shelby
American had installed superchargers
on a handful (the total price was
$215,000).
In March, 2003 Venture filed for
Chapter 11. Larry Winget, sole owner
of the company, is reported to have
sunk $50,000,000 into the Shelby Se-
ries 1 project. The rights to the com-
pany name and unused parts was
unresolved and were in dispute follow-
ing that. In the interim Shelby won
back the rights to his company’s name.
It’s probably something they teach in
a law school course but the details are
far beyond a layman’s ability to com-
prehend.
In 2006 Shelby American an-
nounced they would use the unsold
chassis, bodies and other components
to build a new model called, appropri-
ately enough, the Series II. It would
have a redesigned front and rear and
would carry a $225,000 price tag.
However it never materialized, proba-
bly due to the excessive cost to produce
it and the fact that it would need to be
federally certified. A company called
Superformance Distribution subse-
quently advertised “specially con-
structed vehicles” without engines and
transmissions but only four were re-
portedly built.
There is no shortage of blame to go
around for the failure of this car. Car-
roll Shelby’s health problems and his
advancing age are probably responsi-
ble for him not taking more interest in
the project like he would have when
he was a younger (and hungrier) man.
As with virtually all small companies
like this, it was undercapitalized and
this resulted in the “Robbing from
Peter to pay Paul” syndrome which is
so common in these situations.
Shelby’s initial unrealistic bluster and
promises of light weight and better-
than-Cobra performance as well as a
$75,000 price tag certainly didn’t help.
And Don Rager caused more problems
than he ever solved, despite adopting
a black Stetson and Tony Llama boots.
The Shelby Series 1 is proof that
even someone like Carroll Shelby can
only get so much mileage out of his
original success. The Cobra is often
used as a recipe for automotive suc-
cess, but that success is a combination
of the vehicle as well as its being in the
right place at the right time and sur-
rounded by the right people. History
happens on its own the first time
around. It cannot be coaxed a second
time.
The SHELBY AMERICAN
In the very beginning of the
What-Do-We-Call-It meeting, more
thought was given to what the car
couldn’t
be called. The obvious name
was “Cobra” because that’s what
everyone was already calling
Shelby’s new sports car, but that
name didn’t belong to Shelby any
more. He had sold it to Ford in 1967
(depending on who is telling the
story, the amount paid was either
$1.00 or $1,000,000). However, there
were a few years when Ford didn’t
use the Cobra name on any cars and
copyright laws stipulated that if a
name was not used continuously it
could eventually fall into public do-
main where it could be used by
someone else.
Replica manufacturers, lacking
real legal knowledge, thought this
was a loophole that allowed them to
call their cars “Cobras.” It was a
gray area over which both Ford and
Shelby were at odds because Shelby
wanted to use that name on the cars
he was presently building. Shelby
agreed to call his cars “Shelby Co-
bras” and Ford would go after the
replica companies who were using
the Cobra name without their per-
mission.
The image of a poisonous snake
was obviously appealing to everyone
(you’re thinking, “Viper”), but any-
thing remotely close to “Cobra” – in-
cluding its relatives – was off limits.
Shelby was unimpressed with the
whole concept of a car’s name. “
If it’s
a good car the name won’t matter.
And if it’s a bad car the name won’t
save it.
” He had been saying that
since the 1960s when the GT350
was named, and he still felt it was
true.
The only one who seemed to be
making any sense was design engi-
neer Peter Bryant. He reasoned that
if this first Shelby/Oldsmobile model
was a success, a second car was the
logical next step. He suggested they
call the car the “Shelby Series 1.”
This implied other models would fol-
low and everyone was happy with
that. Bryant even created a badge
which featured a mean-looking
snake’s eye over a checkered flag
pattern that denoted competition.
As it turned out, the most impor-
tant name was not the car’s name
but that of Carroll Shelby. Based on
past experiences, his name on a car
was deemed a guarantee of success.
Or, at least, so it was thought.
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